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The law does not define money, leaving this to 
the discipline of economics. Therefore this analy-
sis of the legal treatment of money perforce be-
gins with the dismal science. Economics defines 
money as a unit of account, a medium of ex-
change and a store of value.2 Commodity money 
is money which has a purpose additional to these; 
it has therefore an intrinsic value, not merely the 
instrumental value (in exchange) possessed of all 
monies. Metals including iron, copper, gold and 
silver have served as money but they may simul-
taneously serve other human needs should they 
be fashioned into pots, pipes, adornments or je-
wellery.3 Commodity-backed money is money 
without instrumental value which is convertible 
into goods that do possess instrumental value. 
Paper notes are commodity-backed money when 
the notes are freely exchangeable for a commod-
ity – gold in the case of currencies on the gold 
standard; the government treasury is obliged to 
perform the conversion from notes to gold or vice 
versa.4  
                                                          
1  The author would like to thank Dr. Ahmad Ghouri 
(University of Sussex Law School), Professor J. S. Bell 
(University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law) and Mr. Norman 
H. D. Foster (SOAS University of London, School of Law) 
for their comments on draft versions of this article. 
2  Robin Wells / Paul Krugman: Economics, Macmillan 
2013, p. 844. This definition originates with Aristotle’s 
Politics, ed. and transl. by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett 1998, 
I 8–10 1257a15–30. 
3  In Wealth of Nations (originally published 1776), Adam 
Smith observes that “iron was the common instrument of 
commerce among the ancient Spartans” and “copper 
among the ancient Romans”, Penguin 1986, books I–III, 
Fiat money is “[m]oney whose value derives en-
tirely from its official status as a means of ex-
change.”5 It exists by government imprimatur 
alone. It is denominated in a currency, the legal 
tender of a country. Money in its de-materialised 
form, as debits or credits in a ledger or in elec-
tronic book entries, lacks intrinsic value, being 
reducible to writing or to negligible pulses of 
electricity. The principle current crypto-curren-
cy, Bitcoin, is a hybrid. It has no official status as 
its issuer’s notional capital, Mt. Gox, is capital of 
no country. However Bitcoin and the blockchain 
of which it is formed highlights an important at-
tribute of national fiat currencies. 
The supply of Bitcoins is (purportedly) finite 
and limited, whereas other fiat monies have no 
quantitative limit. They may be increased inde-
finitely at the discretion of a monetary authority. 
Paper notes in circulation in modern economies 
have no instrumental purpose although they could 
be put to use as origami or as (admittedly diminu-
tive) note paper; they have no intrinsic value other 
than the ink, paper, watermarks, metal threads 
and holographs out of which they are fashioned.  
p. 128. Other commodity currencies in history include silk 
(China), butter (Norway), whale teeth (Fiji) and salt (Ven-
ice), see Stephen G. Cecchetti / Kermit L. Schoenholtz: Mo-
ney, Banking and Financial Markets, McGraw Hill 2015. 
4  In 1717, the United Kingdom converted from a silver 
to a gold standard, suspending the latter in 1914 (due to 
the exigencies of war), restoring it from 1925 until a fatal 
run on pound sterling effectively ended the gold standard 
and the era of commodity backed money in Britain in 
1931. Telegraph: A History of Sterling (8 October 2001), 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399693/A-history-of-ster 
ling.html (last access 14. 08. 2019). 
5  Wells/Krugman (fn. 2), p. 847.  
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The law presupposes the economic definition of 
money. It neither adds to nor subtracts from it. 
However the law, not economics, decides what 
may or may not be done with or by means of 
money. This article concerns a single type of 
transaction involving money: the exchange of 
money for money. This single transaction type 
however has two legal expressions: sale or lease.6 
Since money is not a specific good, lease (bor-
rowing and lending) does not imply return of the 
same money but rather the money’s worth; the 
repayment of the nominal value of the money, in 
addition to which adjustments (for inflation or 
currency fluctuation) may be made and in addi-
tion to which a premium may be payable. The 
legal analysis and ruling on that premium is the 
subject of this article. That premium is known to 
English law as interest. 
Excluding this introduction this article has 
five sections. Section A considers the treatment of 
the time value of money by English and Islamic 
law. Section B re-states the primary Islamic legal 
sources Qurʾān and Sunna, and section C those 
primary sources as elaborated and interpreted by 
Islamic legal scholars. Section D elaborates selec-
ted contributions of behavioural economics re-
garding bounded human rationality and de-
cision-making under conditions of uncertainty or 
incomplete information. Section E concludes with 
observations on the English and Islamic legal 
analyses of money, deducing some insights that 
can inform economic policy, banking law and reg-
ulations and consumer protection. The value of  
                                                          
6  In Islamic law the contract of sale is the contract upon 
which all other contracts are based, see Jeanette A. Wa-
kin: The Function of Documents in Islamic Law: The Chapters 
on Sales from Tahawī’s Kitab al-Shurut al-Kabir, SUNY 
Press 1972, p. 1. 
7  504 Halsbury’s Laws: Income Taxation (2014), 58, 
[1]–[1017]; 58A, [1018]–[1760]; 59, [1761]–[2332], p. 6. 
Savings and Investment Income (1) Interest. The Oxford 
the insights furnished by Islamic commercial law 
(and shared with it by modern behavioural eco-
nomics) is independent of any authority which 
may or may not be accorded to Islamic law – 
viewed as one of the world’s oldest systems of 
law, and as the law of a world religion. 
A  Interest, Usury and the Time Value 
of Money 
I  Disinterest in Interest 
The borrower–lender contractual relationship is 
readily recognisable, and abundant in the laws 
and legal systems of every jurisdiction in the mo-
dern world. With few exceptions – limited to the 
realms of charity and philanthropy – loans of 
capital are made for lender’s profit. Taking or 
paying interest is so ubiquitous as to elicit little 
reflection or comment from consumers, com-
panies, businesses, scholars or legal professio-
nals. As a result where there is a felt need for jus-
tification it is to justify not the earning of interest 
but rather its denial: the limitation or the prohi-
bition of interest – as imposed by Islamic com-
mercial law and the contemporary movement to-
wards its observance. Inverting this, the order of 
things, part II of this section introduces the legal 
analyses of interest in the common law, followed 
in part III by that of the Islamic legal position. 
II  English Law: ‘Time is Money’ 
There is no statutory definition of interest.7 The 
legality of interest-based lending in English law   
English Dictionary (2002): “1. The fact or practice of 
lending money at interest; esp. in later usage the practice 
of charging, taking, or contracting to receive, excessive 
or illegal rates of interest for money on loan”. “2. Premium 
or interest (on money or goods) given or received on loan; 
gain made by lending money. Now arch”. “4. Increase, 
augmentation; advantage”. 
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is long unquestioned.8 The common law defines 
and justifies the payment of loan interest as com-
pensation to the creditor for a delay in payment;9 
for loss of use of the money;10 as consideration 
moving from the debtor for the use of the credi-
tor’s money;11 and as “a creditor’s share of profits 
a debtor is presumed or believed to make from 
the use of the creditor’s money.”12 In the House 
of Lords Westminster Bank Limited v Riches Lord 
Wright said: 
[T]he essence of interest is that it is a payment 
which becomes due because the creditor has 
not had his money at the due date. It may be 
regarded either as representing the profit he 
might have made if he had had the use of the 
money, or, conversely the loss he suffered be-
cause he had not had that use. The general idea 
is that he is entitled to compensation for the de-
privation.13 
Interest is “a payment of money for money”14 pre-
dicated upon the passage of time. Interest-bearing 
bank accounts require no additional analysis be-
yond that accorded interest on loans because the 
relationship of banker and customer is that of 
                                                          
8  A historical treatment on Christian theological and 
doctrinal evolution regarding interest and its legacy in 
contemporary religious institutions and ethical state-
ments in Britain is beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever there is some evidence in the scriptural sources of 
both Judaism and Christianity that usury was con-
demned. The key Biblical verses are Deuteronomy 23:19–
20 and 22:45–25; and Leviticus 25:35–37. See Benjamin 
Nelson: The Idea of Usury, Chicago 1969, pp. 3–28; Vin-
cent J. Cornell: In the Shadow of Deuteronomy: Approa-
ches to Interest and Usury in Judaism and Christianity, 
in: Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding riba, ed. by 
Abdulkader Thomas, Routledge 2006, pp. 13–25. In Dan-
te’s Divine Comedy canto 17 usurers occupy the seventh 
circle of hell. 
9  Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353 
[363] (Farwell J). 
10  Schulze v Bensted (Surveyor of Taxes) 1915 SC 188 at 
191, 7 TC 30 [33] (Ct of Sess) (Lord Strathclyde). 
11  Bennett v Ogston (Inspector of Taxes) (1930) 15 TC 374 
[379] (Rowlatt J). 
debtor-creditor.15 The character of the relation-
ship is the same but the respective positions oc-
cupied by the parties simply reverses in case of 
an overdraft. The fundamental theme of the com-
mon law, formulated in more economistic langu-
age, is that of opportunity cost. Interest is com-
pensation for the loss of opportunities and the 
profit that might have been the creditor’s should 
the outward transfer not have taken place. The 
flip side of the coin as it were is time value. Con-
tracts to monetise the time value of money are 
indisputably lawful at English law. Its legality ex-
tends to the premium payable on a loan – com-
monly called interest.   
 
III  Islamic Law: The Meaning of ribā 
In apparently diametric opposition to English 
law, Islam the religion and the law flowing there-
from have categorically and continuously main-
tained the illegality of paying or receiving 
interest.16 To state the law is not to state em-
pirical or historical compliance with it, however.   
12  Schulze v Bensted, n 10 [33]; Riches v Westminster Bank 
Ltd [1947] AC 390, 28 TC 159 (HL). 
13  [1945] Ch 381. HMRC offers analysis at: SAIM 2060 – 
Interest: Case Law on the Meaning of Interest, 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/saimmanual/saim2060.htm 
(last access 14. 08. 2019). 
14  Re Euro Hotel (Belgravia) Ltd [1975] 3 All ER 1075 
[1084] (Megarry J). 
15  Foley v Hill [1848] 2 HLC 28, 9 ER 1002. US SC: “The 
relations of bank and depositor is that of debtor and credi-
tor, founded upon contract.” Bank of Marin v England 
[1966] 385 US 99, 101 (1966). There are some differ-
ences based on business necessity – and deviations from 
debtor creditor law – Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation 
[1921] 3 KB 110 (CA), and Bhogal v Punjab National Bank 
[1988] 2 All ER 296 (CA). See Ross Cranston: Principles of 
Banking Law, OUP 2002, p. 132. 
16  There were influential and divergent opinions in the 
twentieth century. Most important and persuasively ar-
gued among these were the views of ʿAbd ar-Razzāq Aḥ-
mad as-Sanhūrī Sanhuri, author of the civil codes of 
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There are abundant examples in Muslim societies 
past and present where the prohibition was rou-
tinely breached.17 In twentieth and twenty-first 
century Muslim-majority societies the supply of 
financial services that traffic in interest remains 
the norm. This is true even in those states pur-
porting to be Islamic states, and those the consti-
tutions of which contain a šarīʿa clause.18  
In fact the frequently uttered phrase that ‘Is-
lam(-ic law) bans interest’ greatly simplifies real-
ity. There is no counterpart for ‘interest’ in Ara-
bic – the legal and scriptural language of Islam. 
Instead the legal categorisation of mutual exchan-
ges of money turns upon the meaning of the word 
ribā (ribawī is the adjectival form). ‘Usury’ is a 
closer approximation to this word although it is 
also inexact and for this reason this article prefers 
the Arabic. Ribā does, like usury, interdict the ex-
change of money for money. However it also  
                                                          
Egypt, Iraq, Syria and the commercial code of Kuwait. He 
maintained that simple (but not compound) interest was 
compatible with Islamic law in capitalist countries; Enid 
Hill: Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Signifi-
cance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of ʿAbd al-Raz-
zaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar 1895–
1971, Part II, in: Arab Law Quarterly 3 (1988), pp. 182, 
202. Rašīd Riḍā states that only ribā al-faḍl (to be ex-
plained below) was prohibited, as in: The Fatwas of Imam 
Muḥammad Rashid Rida II, Cairo 1970, p. 608. More re-
cently, and very controversially the religious leader of al-
Azhar, the highest Islamic religious centre in Egypt, Say-
yid Tantāwī, opined in 1989 that interest is not unlawful. 
See Chibli Mallat: Ṭanṭāwī on Banking Operations in Egypt, 
in: Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas, ed. 
by M. Masud, B. Messick and D. Powers, Harvard 1996, 
pp. 286, 296. Maha-Hanaan Balala contends that the main 
issue concerns not interest but deception, and disapprov-
al of “obsession with monetary gains”, Islamic Finance and 
Law: Theory and Practice in a Globalized World, Tauris 
2011, p. 25. 
17  Usury was a frequent occurrence in the Ottoman Em-
pire. Şevket Pamuk: Finance in the Ottoman Empire 
blocks the exchange of certain commodities that 
are not used as legal tender. Given the exceptio-
nalism of Islam among the Abrahamic religions 
and extant legal systems in relation to its position 
on usury, and the potentially far-reaching conse-
quences (for commerce and for consumers) of the 
Islamic rules governing ribawī exchanges, it is no 
surprise that much ink has been spilt on the sub-
ject. In relation to this literature in Islamic law 
and legal studies, this article makes two claims: 
one critical and corrective, and the other con-
structive. The first claim is that existing analyses 
of the principle underlying the ribā rules are in-
correct. Specifically the article aims to refute two 
such principles. These are, the illegality of: 1) the 
commoditization of money, and 2) according a 
time value to money. Having eliminated these 
two principles from the possible justifications for 
the ribā rules, the second and the constructive  
  
1453–1854, in: Handbook of Key Financial Markets Institu-
tions and Infrastructure, ed. by Gerard Caprio, Elsevier 
2013, and his article ‘The Evolution of Financial Institu-
tions in the Ottoman Empire’, in: Financial History Re-
view 11.1 (2004), p. 7. Ebusuud Efendi, Mufti of Istanbul 
(1545–1574 CE) and latterly the Šaiḫ of Islam of the Ot-
toman Empire, defended interest-taking as a matter of ne-
cessity (ḍarūra); M. Rev. MacColl (1881): Are Reforms 
Possible Under Mussulman Rule? (mimeo), as cited in 
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal: ‘Interest’ and the Paradox of Is-
lamic Law and Finance, in: Fordham International Law 
Journal 27.1 (2003), pp. 108 f. 
18  Such as Egypt’s article 2: “The principles of the Is-
lamic sharī’a are the chief source of Egyptian legislation”; 
Afghanistan (article 3); Iran (articles 2–4); Pakistan (ar-
ticle 227); Qatar (article e 1); Yemen (article 3); and Sau-
di Arabia (the Basic Law and Royal Decree No. A/90 Ar-
ticle 1 CB). These are cited in Clark B. Lombardi: Consti-
tutional Provisions Making Sharia ‘A’ or ‘The’ Chief Source 
of Legislation: Where Did They Come from? What Do They 
Mean? Do They Matter?, in: American University Interna-
tional Law Review 28.3 (2013), p. 733. Also relevant is 
Lombardi’s book State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt, 
Brill 2006. 
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aim of this article’s intervention into Islamic law 
is the formulation and defence of an alternative 
explanation, one which it is suggested provides in-
sight and instruction beyond Islamic states and 
societies – extending into the world of financial 
institutions and markets, and the regulation of 
credit, debt and interest.  
B   The Primary Islamic Texts 
I  The Relationship of ribā and Usury 
Whilst ribā encompasses money interest, as that 
is understood – whether expressly or impliedly – 
in English law, it also encompasses exchanges 
where one or both items in an exchange are not 
monetary, provided that one or both of the items 
exchanged fall into the subset of those commod-
ities that Islamic law deems ribawī. Therefore it 
is a mistranslation although a convenient one to 
reduce ribā to usury.19 For this reason the Arabic 
term will be retained in what follows, until the 
conclusion when the broader term usury will re-
appear. Ascertaining the meaning of ribā requires 
a review of all sources of Islamic law. The sources 
of Islamic law are divisible into primary (treated 
in section B, parts III–V) and secondary (treated 
in section C). 
                                                          
19  Although it does little to advance the legal analysis, 
the authoritative Arabic dictionary Lisān al-ʿArab pro-
vides the following etymology: “The root means increase 
from the money raba (past simple): increased and raised 
[…] In the canonical law of Islam, riba is the increase on 
the original amount of money without a sales contract.” 
Translated by Ruba Alfattouh, Abdulkader Thomas and 
Najwa Abdel Hadi: Riba in Lisan al Arab, in: Thomas 
(fn. 8), p. 10. For analysis of the absent sales contract in 
this definition see the section on the murābaḥa contract 
below.  
20  However there are differences not material to this ar-
ticle. “The English term ‘Islamic law’ serves as translation 
II  Šarīʿa and fiqh: a Neglected but    
  Crucial Distinction 
This article treats the terms ‘šarīʿa’ and ‘Islamic 
law’ as synonymous.20 Šarīʿa contains divine com-
mands: aḥkām (sg. ḥukm).21 With regard to the 
commanding or imperative nature of the aḥkām 
and the Islamic philosophy or a comparison with 
a Hobbesian or an Austinian command theory is 
apposite. In the case of Sunni Islam the entirety 
of the primary sources of šarīʿa are exhausted by 
Qurʾān and ḥadīṯ. Muslims believe the Qurʾān to 
be the direct speech of God, recited by the found-
ing Prophet Muḥammad (570–632 CE). This ex-
plains the primacy of Arabic in Islamic legal 
writings and ritual and religious praxis. The ḥadīṯ 
are the express or implied statements of Muḥam-
mad or his companions, as reported and trans-
mitted by witnesses. For present purposes the en-
tirety of the ḥadīṯ are synonymous with the Sun-
na, the normative example that leads and guides 
Muslim pious practice, morality and ethics, and 
ritual observance. 
Qurʾān and ḥadīṯ are the primary sources of 
Islamic law. The usual distinction between prim-
ary and secondary textual sources is that the 
latter are a scholarly treatment of, or a comment-
ary upon, the former. That aspect of the distinc-
tion applies. However there is a further addition.  
  
of both šarīʿa (‘the revealed, or canonical, law of Islam’) 
and fiqh (‘jurisprudence in Islam’). It therefore covers a 
wider range of meanings than those attributed to ‘law’ in 
the modern Western context in that it includes such mat-
ters as worship, personal morality, family relations, and 
public welfare.” Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad / Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser: Introduction ‘Islamic Law and the Challenge of 
Modernity’, in: Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modern-
ity, ed. by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser, Alta Mira 2004, p. 4. 
21  Qurʾān 6:57: ‘The command (ḥukm) is that of God 
alone’ – ‘ ِ اِلِل الَّ ِإ ُمُْكْحلا ِنإ’ (author’s translation). 
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Muslims believe that the primary sources are re-
vealed, meaning they are authored by God and 
disclosed to humanity, via prophecy – nubūwa. 
The secondary sources are the result of human 
thought, rather than manifestations of the mind 
of God. They are sometimes for this reason said 
to be ‘derived’. The Arabic term for the secondary 
sources is fiqh, which literally means ‘under-
standing’, ‘comprehension’, ‘insight’ or ‘know-
ledge.’22 Most often translated as jurisprudence, 
fiqh is actually broader than the English denota-
tion of jurisprudence as it includes all those oper-
ations and techniques that may be applied to ša-
rīʿa in order to render it comprehensible to hu-
mans.23 Using the words šarīʿa and fiqh inter-
changeably, as is often done, neglects this crucial 
distinction.24  
Although the explicit statements about ribā 
are among the most clear of the legal provisos in 
both Qurʾān and Sunna, ribā is never defined in 
the Qurʾān; its meaning remains far from obvious 
even after considering all pertinent ḥadīṯ as well. 
For this reason fiqhī (the adjectival form of fiqh) 
writings on ribā are highly necessary. They are 
the subject of section C below.  
                                                          
22  Hans Wehr (ed.): Arabic-English Dictionary (Spoken 
Language Services 1994). “Fiqh (‘understanding’) connotes 
the efforts and activities, largely on the part of qualified 
scholars, to discover and give expression to the many fa-
cets of Qur’an- and Sunna-derived principles of shari‘a.” 
Fiqh is “an intellectual, literary tradition and/or the so-
phisticated product of centuries of Islamic high legal cul-
ture.” N. Calder: Law, in: Oxford Encyclopedia of the Mo-
dern Islamic World, ed. by J. J. Esposito et al., OUP 1995, 
p. 452. 
23  On the subdivision of fiqh into roots (uṣūl al-fiqh) and 
branches (furūʿ al-fiqh) and the types of legal materials 
where these are found – including elaborating texts and 
analyses (in mabsūṭ) and simplified statements of the 
rules similar to a primer (muḫtaṣar), see the introduction 
III  Qurʾān 
The word ribā appears in four of the 144 chapters 
of the Qurʾān. The following translated excerpts 
are provided with the caveat that no translation 
of the Qurʾān is fully adequate or authoritative, 
for the reasons stated at B II above. It should be 
borne in mind that the selected translations like 
most adopt the most widespread English render-
ing of ribā, as usury. The most extensive reference 
to ribā appears in the second chapter of the Qur-
ʾān. The following verse distinguishes ribā and 
trade and portrays quite graphically the gravity 
of the penalty for repeat offenders: 
Those who live on usury will not rise (on 
Doomsday), but like a man possessed of the de-
vil and demented. This because they say that 
trading is like usury. But trade has been sanc-
tioned and usury forbidden by God.  
Those who are warned by their Lord and desist 
will keep (what they have taken of interest) al-
ready, and the matter will rest with God. But 
those who revert to it again are the residents of 
Hell where they will abide forever. God takes 
away gain from (usury), but adds (profit) to 
charity; and God does not love the ungrateful 
and sinners.25  
by the editors Oussama Arabi, David S. Powers and Susan 
A. Spectorsky: Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Mus-
lim Jurists, Brill 2013, p. 3. 
24  Rudolph Peters and Peri Bearman provide a lucid ex-
planation in ‘Introduction: The Nature of the Sharia’ in 
The Ashgate Research Companion to Islamic Law, ed. by Ru-
dolph Peters and Peri Bearman, Ashgate 2014, p. 1. 
25  2:275–276,  
  ِسَمْلا َنِم ُناَطْياشلا ُه ُطاَبَخَتي يِذالا ُمُوَقي اَمَك الَّ ِإ َنوُمُوَقي َلَّ اَِب رلا َنُوُلْكأَي َنِيذالا   َذ ْمُه اَنأِب  َ ِل
 ُلِْثم ُْعَيْبلا اَم اِنإ اُولاَق اَِب رلا اَِب رلا َم ارَحَو َْعَيْبلا ُ االلَّ الََحأَو  َتناَف ِه ِ بار ن ِم ٌة َظِعْوَم  ُهَءاَج نَم َف  َ‮ه
 ِ االلَّ َ‮ِلإ ُهُرْمَأَو ََفَلس اَم  ُه ََلف  َنُودِلاَخ اَه ِيف ْمُه  ِراانلا ُباَحَْصأ  َ ِئ َلُوأَف َداَع ْنَمَو)275( 
 ُْرَيو اَِب رلا ُ االلَّ ُقَحْم َي ِتاََقداصلا ِيب  ٍمِيَثأ ٍرااَفك الُك ⸮بُِحي َلَّ ُ االلََّو)(276 
in Ahmed Ali: Al-Qur’ān: A Contemporary Translation, 
Princeton 1993. Unless otherwise noted all references to 
the Qurʾān are to this translation.  
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Like this verse two other verses are evidence of 
the existence of usury during the lifetime of Mu-
ḥammad: “O believers, fear God and forego the 
interest that is owing, if you really believe.”26 
And “O you who believe, do not practice usury, 
charging doubled and redoubled (interest); but 
have fear of God: you may well attain your 
goal.”27 Trade and commerce without unjustified 
or unfair increases in fees and prices are here de-
picted as lawful alternative routes to prosperity 
and success. There is also a related Qurʾānic em-
phasis on philanthropy and charity.28  
In conclusion several possible meanings 
emerge from these, the entirety of the Qurʾānic 
verses that contain the word ribā: The illegality 
and immorality of high interest rates (doubling 
and re-doubling), the expectation of a punitive 
response (in the hereafter), and the existence of 
positive, preferred alternatives – trading, charity 
and benevolence. In case it is not already appar-
ent, it should be observed that the Qurʾān is in 
countless ways different to a statute – notwith-
standing political attempts to treat it as such.29 
                                                          
26  Ibid., 2:278: 
  اَه ⸮َيأ اَي َنِيِنمْؤ⸮م ُمتُنك ِنإ اَِب رلا َنِم َِيَقب اَم اوَُرذَو َ االلَّ اُوقاتا اُوَنمآ َنِيذالا 
27  Ibid., 3:130: 
  َنوُِحْلُفت ْمُكاَلَعل َ االلَّ اُوقاتاَو ۖ ًة ََفعاَض⸮م اًفاَْعَضأ اَِب رلا اُوُلْكَأت َلَّ اُوَنمآ َنِيذالا اَه ⸮َيأ اَي 
28  Ibid., 30:39: 
  َمَو ِ االلَّ َدِنع ُوْبَري ⸮َ َف ِساانلا ِلاَوْم َأ ِيف َُوْبرَِي ل اًِب ر ن ِم ُمْتَيتآ ا  ُت ٍةاََكز ن ِم ُمْتَيتآ اَمَو َنُودِير
 َنُوِفْعُضمْلا ُمُه   َ ِئ َلُوأَف ِ االلَّ َه ْجَو 
29  In terms of consolidated states, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia: article 1 of the 1992 Basic Law states that ‘God’s 
book’ (i. e. the Qurʾān) is the constitution (also see fn. 18). 
The Muslim Brothers have since its foundation in 1928 by 
Hasan al-Banna maintained the Qurʾān as constitution; 
on the organisation: Richard P. Mitchell: The Society of the 
Muslim Brothers, OUP 1993. 
30  For example Z. Ahmad: The Qur’anic Theory of Riba, 
in: Islamic Law Quarterly 20.3 (1978), pp. 3 f., which 
claims that the meaning of ribā was known at the time of 
the revelation of the Qurʾān, which is why no definition 
was needed at that time.  
31  The number of Qurʾānic verses is 6326, comparable 
to the number of ḥadīṯ; however there is only accepted 
Although compared with other words possessing 
legal meaning in the Qurʾān ribā is explained re-
latively extensively, nevertheless no precise and 
unambiguous definition of ribā emerges.30  
For insight into the meaning of the key terms 
ribā and ribawī resort must now be made to the 
Sunna. 
IV  Ḥadīṯ 
There are five or six thousand ḥadīṯ. The impre-
cision of this estimate is a preliminary indication 
that the Arabic content of the Qurʾān is more un-
animously accepted as certain, than is the case 
with the ḥadīṯ.31 In contrast with the Qurʾān 
where any disputes about the text are at best 
marginal, there is latitude to challenge or im-
peach the authority of a given ḥadīṯ when two or 
more ḥadīṯ appear to be contradictory.32 Each ḥa-
dīṯ is accompanied by the chain of transmission 
(isnād), that is by the names of the initial witnes-
ses and those transmitters linking the eye- and 
ear-witness(es) to the time when the ḥadīṯ was   
compilation of the Qurʾān whereas there are six compila-
tions of ḥadīṯ, and as will become apparent in this section 
it is much more common to debate the authenticity of a 
given ḥadīṯ than that of a given verse of the Qurʾān. The 
Qurʾānic structure does not guarantee this result as it is 
largely non-narrative in form so the reason for its cohe-
sion arises instead from the history of its codification not 
from its content. 
32  This issue should be distinguished from the scholarly 
debate as to whether the ḥadīṯ accurately reported Pro-
phetic behaviour. Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan Juris-
prudence, Oxford 1950 – drawing on the works of the Ger-
man Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher – argued few, if any, 
could be considered authentic accounts of prophetic be-
haviour. See M. M. Azami: On the Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence, Wiley 1985; there is a summary of the de-
bate in David S. Powers: Studies in Qur’an and Hadith, Uni-
versity of California Press 1986; and in Harald Motzki: 
The Musannaf of ʿAbd al-Razaq San’anī as a Source of Au-
thentic Ahadīth of the First Century, AH, in: Journal of 
Near Eastern Studies 50 (1991), p. 1. 
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first uttered, performed or reduced to writing. 
The isnād provides a reason for the Islamic legal 
practitioner to prefer one ḥadīṯ over another; 
some witnesses are esteemed as more reliable 
(due to their known honesty, prodigious memor-
ies, demonstrated accuracy, and so forth) than 
others. Due to the number of compilations and 
disputes about the respective strength of ḥadīṯ an 
exact number concerning ribā is unascertainable. 
Restricting for present purposes the count to 
those ḥadīṯ expressly mentioning ribā, there are 
between ten and twenty. The most instructive of 
these are excerpted in this section. 
As an example of a truncated isnād, consider 
the following ḥadīṯ: “Ibn Masʿūd (may Allāh be 
pleased with him) relates, ‘The Messenger of Al-
lāh (peace and blessings of Allāh be upon him)’ 
cursed the devourer of riba, his constituent, the 
one who acts as a witness to it, and one who acts 
as a notary to it.”33 This ḥadīṯ is more severe than 
any Qurʾānic reference. The net is cast more wi-
dely to catch not only accomplices but innocent 
third parties who might accidentally witness the 
transacting of ribā. There are no second chances.  
                                                          
33  Wahba az-Zuḥailī in Iman Abdul Rahim / Abdulkader 
Thomas (translators): The Juridical Meaning of riba, in: 
Thomas (fn. 8), pp. 26 f. Isnād are usually longer than a 
single person, but not necessarily reproduced in whole or 
even at all when a ḥadīṯ is quoted. Similarly emphatic ḥa-
dīṯ on the evil of ribā are at Buḫārī: Saḥīḥ, book 8, vol. 82, 
ḥadīṯ 840, where ribā is classed as one of the seven great 
sins. Another ḥadīṯ states that the prohibition on ribā was 
declared by the Prophet at the same time as that on the 
ban of intoxicants: book 3, vol. 34, and ḥadīṯ 299. 
34  The chapters of the Qurʾān are not ordered chronolo-
gically but grouped into Meccan and Medinan chapters 
to correspond with the location of the Prophet Muḥam-
mad and with it the condition and degree of consolidation 
of the Muslim community. Muḥammad’s experience in 
Mecca is not accepted by all observers as significant. “The 
fact that the principal passages against interest belong to 
the Medina period and that the Jews are reproached with 
Some ḥadīṯ expressly back-refer to the Qurʾān, 
and (as in the following ḥadīṯ) the order in which 
Qurʾānic verses were revealed.34 “The last verse re-
vealed to the Prophet was the verse dealing with 
usury (i. e. ribā).”35 Whilst this ḥadīṯ is emphatic, 
of greater legal significance are the ḥadīṯ concern-
ing blocked exchanges: “The Prophet forbade ex-
change of the same commodities of different 
qualities.”36 Spot exchange of money in different 
currencies is lawful, or so the following aphorism 
has been understood to mean: “There is no Riba 
(in money exchange) except when it is not done 
from hand to hand (i. e. when there is delay in 
payment).”37 Two commodities serving as money 
in Islamic history were gold and silver. These 
could be exchanged at spot but only in (rather 
improbably) equal quantities: 
The bartering of gold for silver is Riba, except 
if it is from hand to hand and equal in amount, 
and wheat grain for wheat grain is usury except 
if it is from hand to hand and equal in amount, 
and dates for dates is usury except if it is from 
hand to hand and equal in amount, and barley 
for barley is usury except if it is from hand to 
hand and equal in amount.38  
breaking the prohibition, suggest that the Muslim prohib-
ition of ribā owes less to the conditions in Mekka than to 
the Prophet’s closer acquaintance with Jewish doctrine 
and practice in Medina.” J. Schacht: Riba, in: Encyclope-
dia of Islam, Brill 1987, p. 1148. 
35  Book 6, vol. 60, ḥadīṯ 67 (fn. 33). As above there is 
more than one verse dealing with ribā but it is likely that 
this ḥadīṯ is a reference to the longest chapter, and verses 
2:275 f. and 2:278. 
36  Continuing: “[B]ut with the change that Isḥāq and Ibn 
al-Muṭannā used the word Zabn in place of Riba and Ibn 
Abu ‘Umar used the word Riba (interest).” Muslim: Saḥīḥ, 
book 10, ḥadīṯ 3689, variation on the theme at 3687. 
37  Book 3, vol. 34, ḥadīṯ 386 (fn. 33); “hand to hand” 
(yadan bi-yadin) is the literal rendering of spot trans-
action. 
38  Book 3, vol. 34, aḥādīṯ 344, 379, 382 and as follows 
499 (fn. 33): “The selling of gold for gold is ribā (usury) 
except if the exchange is from hand to hand and equal in 
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This account would be incomplete without the 
addition of two aḥādīṯ that do not explicitly 
mention ribā. The first is one in which there is a 
broader conflation of unjustified price inflation 
and dishonesty.39 The second emphasises the du-
ty to pay debts when able: ‘Procrastination in 
paying debts by a wealthy man is injustice.’40 As 
the position on penalties or fees for late payment 
is at least under some suspicion in Islamic law, 
timely satisfaction of debts becomes essentially a 
matter of honour and moral obligation. However 
this ḥadīṯ has no necessary implications for ribā 
as it may deal only with a payment of principal 
on an interest-free loan (qarḍ ḥasan), a recog-
nised method of Islamic philanthropy. 
V  The Elusive Character of the  
 Primary Sources  
Although among the most often repeated legal 
provisions having commercial import in the Qur-
ʾān and ḥadīṯ, the meaning of ribā and therefore 
the implications of its condemnation remains far 
from clear even after an exhaustive review of ex-
press provisions in the primary materials. The 
textual šarīʿa leaves wide latitude for definition 
and interpretation. When the evolution of law, so-
ciety, economics and the modern trading and fi-
nancial infrastructure are contemplated it quick-
ly becomes apparent that this latitude yawns  
                                                          
amount, and similarly, the selling of wheat for wheat is 
ribā (usury) unless it is from hand to hand and equal in 
amount, and the selling of barley for barley is usury un-
less it is from hand to hand and equal in amount, and 
dates for dates, is usury unless it is from hand to hand 
and equal in amount)”. 
39  Narrated by ʿAbdullāh bin Abī ʿAufa: “A man dis-
played some goods in the market and took a false oath 
that he had been offered so much for them though he was 
not offered that amount. Then the following Divine Verse 
open into a chasm. It provides a compelling de-
monstration of the distance the Islamic lawyer (or 
for that matter any individual Muslim) must tra-
vel from šarīʿa to its application (taṭbīq) in a con-
temporary setting.  
C  Islamic Legal Opinion: Identifying 
ribawī Property and Contracts 
What follows in this section is a schematic de-
scription of a consensus emerging from classical 
Islamic legal writings and opinions on ribā. There 
are minor doctrinal differences between legal 
schools of thought (maḏhab; pl. maḏāhib) but 
these are almost entirely omitted as they are im-
material here. There are two types of ribā, and 
they are partially overlapping: credit ribā (ribā 
an-nasīʾa) and surplus ribā (ribā al-faḍl). Together 
these two types exhaust what will hereinafter be 
called ‘the ribā rules.’  
I  Credit ribā (ribā an-nasīʾa) 
This is the genus of ribā known in pre-Islamic 
Arabia and during the life-time of the Prophet 
Muḥammad. It is most likely the type featured in 
the Qurʾān.41 In the Islamic legal literature it is 
also described as the ribā of ignorance: ribā al-ǧā-
hilīya. Rather than referring to an absence of 
knowledge, ignorance here refers to pre-Islamic  
  
was revealed: Verily! Those who purchase a little gain at 
the cost of Allāh’s covenant and their oaths … Will get 
painful punishment.” (3:77) Ibn Abu ʿ Aufa added: ‘Such 
person as described above is a treacherous ribā -eater (i. e. 
eater of usury)’. Book 3, vol. 48, ḥadīṯ 841 (fn. 33). 
40  Book 37, vol. 3, ḥadīṯ 486 (fn. 33). 
41  Zuḥailī (fn. 33), p. 27: “Credit ribā, which was the 
only type known by the pre-Islamic Arabs. This type is 
taken against a delay in settlement of a due debt, regard-
less whether the debt be that of a goods sold or a loan”. 
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Arabia.42 In credit ribā the amount of goods or 
money payable is altered in exchange for an al-
teration of the due date: increased for a postpone-
ment or decreased for an earlier return date.43 
The alteration of the amount payable can occur 
before or after the original return date; these si-
tuations are comparable to pre-payment, or to an 
early form of financing respectively. 
II  Surplus ribā (ribā al-faḍl) 
This type of ribā governs the exchange commod-
ities, excluding money. A commodity by defin-
ition is a non-specific good, as that is expressed 
in English contract law. The same quantity of the 
same grade of commodity is interchangeable 
with any other. In Islamic law a commodity is a 
good which is measured by weight or volume, 
which by a different means implies that commod-
ities are interchangeable, provided that they are 
of the same quality or grade. In other words these 
goods are fungible (miṯlī).44 
Surplus ribā interdicts two types of transac-
tion. First, it blocks the exchange of the same com-
modity of different grades; for example, the ex-
change of a greater amount of low-grade wheat 
for a lesser amount of high-grade wheat. Second, 
it blocks the exchange of the same or disparate 
amounts of different commodities; for example, 
the exchange of salt for barley. Gold and silver 
are included among the commodities expressly 
regulated by the ribā al-faḍl rule. The other five  
                                                          
42  Some pre-Islamic custom (ʿurf) and conventions (ā-
ḍāt) are a source drawn upon by both Qurʾān and ḥadīṯ, 
whilst other such practices extant at the time of the ar-
rival of Islam (including ribā and female infanticide) are 
forbidden.  
43  Zuḥailī (fn. 33), p. 43. 
44  Logically it is apparent that non-specific goods are a 
larger category as they could include, for example, new 
cars or appliances, etc.; there were some but relatively 
expressly named commodities are not precious 
metals, but low-value consumables: wheat, bar-
ley, salt, raisins and dry dates.45 A minority view, 
that of the Ẓāhirīs – following a characteristically 
literalist interpretation – treats the list of seven 
items as exhaustive.46 This interpretation implies 
that fiat money would be exempt from the ribā 
rules. However the dominant view, that of the 
four major Sunni legal schools, is that the rule 
applies to other commodities which are analo-
gous to the seven named ribawī goods. Such rea-
soning by analogy (qiyās) is a common technique 
for extending the law to apply to novel facts, and 
to facts or circumstances not expressly envisaged 
by the primary sources. Analogical reasoning en-
tails a two-stage procedure. First, which charac-
teristic(s) do the seven ribawī goods share? Se-
cond, which characteristic(s) must another good 
display in order to be deemed, like them, ribawī? 
The selected comparators are the ʿillāt al-ḥukum 
(plural); or the ʿilla (singular).47 The material 
question is whether fiat money is ribawī proper-
ty – in Arabic, māl ribawī. Gold and silver were 
used at and after the time of Islamic revelation as 
a unit of account, a medium of exchange, and a 
store of value – as fiat money is now ubiquitously 
deployed. By operation of qiyās then it is evident 
that fiat money – that is cash, denominated as na-
tional currency – is māl ribawī.48 Identical reason-
ing clearly applies to money in its de-materia-
lised forms and to crypto-currencies and block-
chain.  
few such manufactured artefacts in early Muslim socie-
ties. 
45  Zuḥailī (fn. 33), p. 27. 
46  Emad H. Khalil: An Overview of the Shari’a Prohibi-
tion of riba, in: Thomas (fn. 8), pp. 55 and 65.  
47  For an accessible explanation see Nabil Saleh: Unlaw-
ful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, CUP 1986, 
pp. 14 and 17. 
48  W. M. Ballantyne: Commercial Law in the Arab Middle 
East, London 1986, p. 123. 
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III  The Commodification of Money  
in English and Islamic Law 
It is self-evident that in English law money can 
be bought and sold as a commodity. Hence the 
institutions of the money market or the capital 
market. The names speak for themselves. In a 
highly regarded work by Frank Vogel and Samuel 
L. Hayes III, the authors state that in Islamic law 
by contrast “[m]oney is not treated as a commod-
ity, as in the West.”49 However since as argued in 
the section immediately above money is analo-
gous to gold and silver, and gold and silver are 
two of the seven expressly ribawī commodities, it 
follows that Islamic law does permit treating 
money as a commodity. There is no legal bar to 
doing so. Since the positions of English and Is-
lamic law are identical in relation to the com-
modification of money, the position on this mat-
ter cannot explain the Islamic law against charg-
ing a money premium on the sale or purchase, or 
the lending or borrowing, of money. 
IV  Reprise: the Time Value of Money 
In Islamic economic history a barter economy 
gave way to commodity money (gold and silver) 
which in turn gave way to the mint and to the 
artefacts it manufactured: fiat money, most often 
denominated as dinars or dirhams.50   
                                                          
49  Frank E. Vogel / Samuel L. Hayes III: Islamic Law and 
Finance, Kluwer Law International 1998, pp. 2 f. 
50  Which remains the names of the currencies in the 
UAE, Iraq, Qatar, Jordan, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Libya among others. 
51  Ar-ribā, Mausūʿat ar-Risāla s.d., pp. 20 f. and the mag-
num opus of the most famous proponent of an Islamic eco-
nomics, Muḥammad aṣ-Ṣadr: Iqtiṣādunā [Our Economics], 
Dār at-Taʾrūf  s.d., p. 639. 
52  Timur Kuran: The Absence of the Corporation in Is-
lamic Law: Origins and Persistence, in: The American Jour-
nal of Comparative Law 53.4 (2005), pp. 785, 797 f., 816–
819, 831–834. The closest equivalent is that of the chari-
table trust (waqf). For source material on the waqf see 
Scott Morrison: The Social and Legislative History of the 
Therefore Islamic law has evolved together with 
the development of fiat money. As already estab-
lished fiat money is māl ribawī which accordingly 
falls to be regulated by the ribā rules. Having dis-
missed commodification as an explanation, an-
other possible justification for the ribā rules is 
that Islamic law unlike English law does not per-
mit the ascription of time value to money. The 
locus classicus of this position is to be found in the 
writing of two scholars: Sayyid Abū al-Aʿlā Mau-
dūdī and Muḥammad Bāqir aṣ-Ṣadr.51 Unfortuna-
tely this explanation also founders as it is clear 
that Islamic law permits according time value to 
money. However the monetisation of the time va-
lue of money is achieved not by means of interest 
as at English law, but by means of partnerships 
and ‘cost-plus-profit’ credit sales (murābaḥa).  
As in England (as evidenced by the Law of 
Partnership Act 1890 and subsequent company 
law statutes) partnerships were long the domin-
ant business structure in Muslim societies; Is-
lamic legal scholars only latterly and informally 
accepted the doctrine of separate legal personal-
ity and the company52 limited by shares or gua-
rantee. In Islamic law the law of partnership con-
sists in joint partnerships (mušāraka) and sleep-
ing partnerships (mudāraba).53 Each of these ef-
fectively imputes a time value to money. This is 
particularly clear in the case of the muḍāraba 
Islamic Trust (waqf) in Mauritius, in: Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 45.1 (2015), pp. 1–4. The waqf differs from the 
company in that it is not for profit. And it differs from the 
English trust in that it is necessarily perpetual (contra the 
English rule against perpetuities), at least until the assets 
are exhausted and it may be wound up in a procedure sim-
ilar to cy prés. 
53  Meǧelle, 10th Book, Preface-Definitions and Chapters 
I–VII; see also Chapter VIII re other partnerships not dis-
cussed here. Written in Ottoman Turkish and translated 
into Arabic (al-Maǧallat al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdlīya – literally: 
The Journal of Judicial Rules) is available in English as The 
Mejelle, The Other Press 2007. On its significance past 
and present, see Chibli Mallat: Introduction to Middle Eas-
tern Law, OUP 2009, p. 245.  
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where the investor of capital (rabb al-māl) earns a 
return without any personal labour or any man-
dated entrepreneurial or managerial engagement 
with the business enterprise. In contrast to a fixed 
income security, however, in a partnership the 
return on the investment can be neither guaran-
teed nor profit amounts fixed in advance, and the 
investor stands to lose his or her entire capital 
contribution – as with an equity or a share. A 
partnership is not a debt relationship,54 and there 
can be no contractual duty to re-pay as there 
would be for a borrower. However should the en-
terprise be profitable, the investor is contractual-
ly entitled to a share of the profits, and to be com-
pensated for the loss of their access to the money; 
in the interim, in other words, the partner or in-
vestor is compensated for the time value of their 
money and for the opportunity costs thereby in-
curred. 
A second example of the time value of money 
in trite Islamic law is the murābaḥa contract. It is, 
simply, a credit sale of goods. A premium is 
charged (relative to the spot price) for a delayed 
payment arrangement; that is, as compensation 
for the loss of the use of money for a period of 
time. In its modern instantiation a bank purchases 
a product at the request of a customer. Upon tak-
ing possession, the bank sells the product on to 
the customer on deferred or instalment payment 
terms. The bank does not act as a money-lender. 
Instead, the bank acts as a trader, charging a 
mark-up relative to cost. The presence of a non-
monetary asset renders the transaction lawful; if 
                                                          
54  Vogel/Hayes (fn. 49), pp. 2 f.: ‘If investors finance the 
acquisition of tangible goods by sale or lease, they may le-
gitimately compensate themselves for foregone opportun-
ities. Profits deriving from lease payments or from credit 
sale may reflect, even explicitly, a time factor.’  
55  Westminster Bank (fn. 13); Re Euro Hotel (fn. 14), pa-
ra. 1084. See also Martin Heckel: Wie islamisch ist Is-
lamic Finance? – ein Beitrag zum Trust als Rückgrat isla-
mischer Zertifikate (Ṣukūk), in: Islamisches Recht in Wis-
the subject matter of the sale were money or re-
ceivables it would breach the credit ribā rule. In 
terms of accounting the excess payable is charac-
terised as profit rather than interest; although 
benchmarks are used (sometimes problematical-
ly) in Islamic finance and retail banking there is 
no necessary reliance on an interest rate (i. e. the 
wholesale rate at which the bank itself can bor-
row money) as there would be in case of a loan 
or a bond spread. Setting aside recurrent argu-
ments about whether the modern deployments of 
mušāraka, muḍāraba and murābaḥa contracts rise 
to the level of sham transactions, or rely on ob-
jectionable legal fictions, it is evident in any 
event that there is an implied sanction of money’s 
time value. Islamic law then does not differ in 
this respect to English law.55 The position on 
treating money as a commodity is also, as already 
established, common ground. Therefore it is ne-
cessary to look elsewhere in order to explain the 
divergence of English and Islamic law regarding 
the legality of usury, and the reason for the ribā 
rules. 
V  Two Alternative Explanations  
Ribā blocks some transactions that would be re-
garded in all national jurisdictions56 as dealing in 
interest. Regarding the relationship of the two 
types of ribā, “surplus ribā implies credit ribā”.57 
However surplus ribā also interdicts other, addi-
tional transactions – as seen in section C part II. 
Therefore it is necessary to explain surplus ribā.  
  
senschaft und Praxis: Festschrift zu Ehren von Hans-Georg 
Ebert, ed by Hatem Elliesie, Beate Anam and Thoralf Han-
stein, Berlin 2018, pp. 371–394 (376). 
56  According to the English court at least Islamic law is 
non-national: Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd and Ors v Sha-
mil Bank of Bahrain EWCA Civ 19, [40], [43], [48]. 
57  For example if “a person sells gold, for example, on 
credit, then pays back in silver more than the equivalent 
of what he had taken in gold.” Zuḥailī (fn. 33), p. 27. 
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Having done so the reasoning underpinning cre-
dit ribā will become apparent. This section re-
ports the justifications that two Islamic legal 
scholars have advanced for the rule on surplus 
ribā. These two accounts, emanating from within 
Islamic intellectual traditions, form the skeleton 
to which a critical and more contemporary ana-
lysis will add body and flesh in section D. 
1  Ibn Qaiyim: Economic  
and Commercial Utility  
In the fourteenth century an Arab jurist Ibn Qai-
yim (1292–1350 CE) advanced an argument 
based on economic necessity. He claimed that pro-
perty must be priced as a condition precedent to 
sale. It must not be bartered on terms that are 
unequal, whether the inequality of the trade 
should be with respect to the quality or quantity 
of the property. He assumed that the value of 
money in which goods are priced must be fixed. 
The results are the same whether his theory is 
construed to require pricing in either commodity 
money (gold and silver) or fiat money.  
 Dirhams and dinars are the prices of articles 
sold and the price is the standard by which the 
evaluation of property is recognized. It must 
therefore be fixed and regulated so that it does 
not go up or down, since were the price to go 
up or down like commodities, we would not 
have a price with which to value the articles 
sold. Indeed, everything is a commodity and the 
people’s need for a price by which to value the 
articles sold is a general and compelling one.58 
‘Commodity’ here is evidently used to include 
fungible and non-fungible goods, and in fact to 
apply to any property – which is to say anything 
capable of being owned or sold: all property, real  
                                                          
58  Quoted in Ballantyne (fn. 48), p. 123. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Book 3, vol. 38, ḥadīṯ 506 (fn. 33). 
and personal, in the language of English law. He 
continues, explaining fixed prices as a requisite 
for commensurability: 
Such valuing is not possible save on the basis of 
a rate by which to know value. This requires a 
price on the basis of which things are assessed, 
which continues upon one state of affairs, and 
which is not (itself) assessed by reference to 
anything else. If it becomes a commodity which 
goes up and down, then the transactions of the 
people will be impaired.59  
The argument against barter and in favour of 
pricing by means of money is a utilitarian or 
functional argument in that pricing (and there-
fore money) are presented as necessary in order 
to facilitate trade and exchange. A further ḥadīṯ 
which lends support to Ibn Qaiyim’s interpreta-
tion is as follows:  
Once Bilāl brought Barni [a high grade, sweet 
date] to the Prophet and the Prophet asked him, 
“From where have you brought these?” Bilāl re-
plied, “I had some inferior type of dates and ex-
changed two Sas [a unit of measure] of it for 
one Sa of Barni dates in order to give it to the 
Prophet; to eat.” Thereupon the Prophet said, 
“Beware! Beware! This is definitely Riba […] 
Don’t do so, but if you want to buy (a superior 
kind of dates) sell the inferior dates for money 
and then buy the superior kind of dates with 
that money.60  
The ḥadīṯ does not articulate the reason for at-
taching a monetary value to goods but is empha-
tic that the failure to do so for an exchange of 
dates of differing qualities breaches the ribā 
rules. Ibn Qaiyim calls such an exchange covert 
or hidden ribā – and condemns it as a pretext to 
committing forbidden acts, impliedly credit 
ribā.61 However since surplus ribā includes five  
  
61  Zuḥailī (fn. 33), p. 27, as stated in the ḥadīṯ: “Do not 
sell one dirham for two, for I fear for you that you fall 
into ribā”, which suggests the equation of interest and 
ribā is not as obvious as it is now commonly thought. 
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edible commodities that did not and do not func-
tion as money, it is not apparent that surplus ribā 
adds anything essential if the aim were to inter-
dict credit ribā alone. 
2  Ibn Rušd: Transactional Justice  
Earlier, in the twelfth century, Muslim philoso-
pher Ibn Rušd (1126–1198 CE)62 offered an ana-
lysis of surplus ribā. The intentions of the law, 
and the motive of justice and of avoiding harm 
are foremost in his account – as against Ibn Qai-
yim’s analysis, which privileged commerce and 
utility over more directly humanistic concerns: 
It is clear from the šarīʿa that the intention be-
hind the impermissibility of riba is the enor-
mous amount of unjust harm which accrues 
therefrom, since justice in financial transac-
tions occurs when commodities are exchanged 
for an exact equivalent. However, since exactly 
equal exchange is a rare thing when trading 
commodities which are of different essences, 
the dinar and dirham are used in order to eva-
luate their value. Furthermore, justice and 
equality in trading commodities of different es-
sences [qualities] occur when their value is pro-
portionate to one another, meaning that the 
proportionate value of one of the two counter-
values in relation to its kind is equal to the 
proportionate value of the other counter-value 
in relation to its kind. Hence commutative 
transactions of countable commodities necessi-
tate a difference of the products one to another 
when sold; while justice in those objects mea-
sured by volume or weight is by equality of 
amount in the volume or weight.63 
Ibn Rušd here echoes (and may well have been 
influenced by) Aristotle’s remarks on absolute  
                                                          
62  Known in Europe, historically, as Averroës. 
63  Ibn Rušd: al-Muqaddimāt al-Mumahhidāt [The Intro-
ductions and the Prefaces], Matbaʿat as-Saʿāda s. d., p. 42. 
The inspiration for the treatments of Ibn Rušd and Ibn 
and proportionate equality.64 His is fundamental-
ly a normative argument predicated on a substan-
tive conception of justice. He states that trades of 
identical goods are just, even as he acknowledges 
the non-commerciality of such an exchange; the 
purpose of this tautology is likely to emphasise 
the value of equality and proportionality, as mat-
ters of fairness, rather than to prescribe specific 
kinds of transactions. Where there can be no 
doubt about the equality of the goods exchanged 
there can be no injustice or harm. Conversely 
where there is subjectivity, as when quantities 
and grades do not match and judgments must be 
made, there is a high probability of errors or of 
other mistake, deceit, fraud, unfairness or exploi-
tation. As with Ibn Qaiyim’s prescriptions, at-
taching a value measured in money allows each 
party to reduce these dangers. An intermediate 
step is made as compared with direct barter: 
goods are converted to money which can then be 
converted back to goods. The following section 
expands upon the insights of Ibn Qai m and Ibn 
Rušd to develop a fuller account of the justifica-
tion and effects of the ribā rules.  
D  Reading the ribā Rules through  
Economics and Psychology 
I  Ibn Qaiyim, Ibn Rušd  
and Modern Economic Theory 
Ibn Qaiyim’s analysis of fixed prices and curren-
cies is now anachronistic given the existence of a 
large and highly developed foreign exchange 
market. Any currency and by extension all 
money’s worth can very easily be measured in 
another currency – as it is at high speeds and  
  
Qaiyim was Mahmoud A. El-Gamal: An Attempt to Un-
derstand the Economic Wisdom (ḥikma) in the Prohibi-
tion of ribā, in: Thomas (fn. 8), p. 112. 
64  In both Nicomachean Ethics, Hackett 1999; and Politics 
(fn. 2). 
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with great frequency on a daily basis. The rate of 
exchange of most currencies floats, while some 
others are fixed. Forex affects capital controls, 
cross-border contracts and commercial parties 
obligated under them, company and consumer 
purchasing power parity, and national trade bal-
ances. However the type of economic impairment 
that Ibn Qaiyim warns against is simple to ima-
gine even if it is not fully articulated: less trade 
due to uncertainty and the fear (or more probably 
the reality) of exploitation, extortionate or (effec-
tively) monopolistic pricing, unjust enrichment 
or otherwise unconscionable bargains. Modern 
economics presumes a money economy and the 
foreign exchange market. In a normative register 
it holds that competition is in general salubrious 
and should be promoted as it extracts gains from 
comparative advantage and the division of labour; 
it leads to higher productivity, efficiency and 
growth; higher production values; lower prices 
and better quality and value for consumers; and 
generates employment and profits. Since ceteris 
paribus more trade is better than less, any uncer-
tainty or reduction in consumer activity or confi-
dence, such as that borne of inconsistent or non-
existent pricing has deleterious consequences 
which should be mitigated. 
Whilst Ibn Qaiyīm makes an economic or uti-
litarian argument in which prices serve an instru-
mental purpose, Ibn Rušd’s analysis of ribā 
amounts to an argument from justice. Ibn Rušd 
invokes pricing and its incidental effects: fair-
ness, protection of vulnerable parties and more 
just outcomes. Both Ibn Qaiyīm and Ibn Rušd call 
for marking to market – that is, allowing price to 
be determined by supply and demand in an open 
market where price information is freely avail-
able under competitive conditions. 
                                                          
65  Edward Cartwright: Behavioural Economics, Routledge 
2011, p. 3. However Cartwright considers the antecedent 
II Economic Actors, Models, and Markets  
This article has revealed the congruity of Islamic 
and English law regarding two characteristics of 
money: time value and the treatment of money 
as commodity. It then set out the additional rules 
to which money is subject in Islamic law. This 
section draws upon psychological insights in or-
der to unpack the analyses of Ibn Qaiyim and Ibn 
Rušd, and to further explore possible justifica-
tions for, and the consequences of, the ribā rules.  
Every economic model either tacitly or expli-
citly makes assumptions about the fundamental 
unit of analysis: the economic actor. Every model 
imputes characteristics to the economic actor, 
seeking at once to explain and to predict actions, 
outcomes and the distribution or allocation of re-
sources: goods and services. The economic model 
that is commonly considered the ‘standard’ mo-
del presupposes that economic actors (whether 
legal or natural persons) are rational and self-in-
terested. This model has however been chal-
lenged over the last three or four decades.65 Con-
tra the standard model, behavioural economics 
queries whether economic actors actually do act 
consistently and rationally, and in particular 
whether they do so under conditions of uncer-
tainty and imperfect information – that is, under 
those conditions encountered pervasively in ac-
tual economic life. Traditional economics con-
structs models that deliberately simplify reality 
in order to subject empirical events to rigorous 
study and analysis and to make predictions about 
future events. This is a valuable exercise and such 
simplifying assumptions are indispensable for 
many purposes, including the development and 
implementation of micro- and macro-economic 
policy. The standard model and the methods re-
fined by its application may however be im-
proved by carefully incorporating insights from 
behavioural economics.   
to be Adam Smith’s 1759 book Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(p. 5).  
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Empirical and experimental results have revealed 
biases that appear to be hard-wired into the hu-
man mind, proclivities which produce what are 
(when compared with the standard model’s pre-
sumed economic actors) errors. These irrational 
decisions of individuals interact and aggregate to 
produce sub-optimal economic distributions and 
equilibria. Each of these foibles, or their expres-
sion in economic life, is predicated upon or faci-
litated by the circulation of money. In each 
money is both a contributing cause and simulta-
neously a partial solution to the flawed rational-
ity and other weaknesses in thought, attitude and 
action which economic actors (including both le-
gal and natural persons) exhibit. Therefore what 
follows are not intrinsic characteristics of money 
but characteristics of money imbued into it by 
the human relationship with, and responsiveness 
to, money. These characteristics are essential to 
understand in order to critically analyse the legal 
regulation of money, and what the law should or 
should not allow people to do with money. 
Market interactions of the simple sort contem-
plated by Islamic commercial and contract law66 
in its early years and well into its classical age 
were bilateral agreements concluded in person;  
                                                          
66  A concise account of contract in Islamic law is avail-
able in David Nethercott and Craig Eisenberg: Islamic Fi-
nance: Law and Practice, OUP 2012. 
67  In situations of interdependence, those where “one per-
son’s behavior affects another person’s well-being posi-
tively or negatively. Such situations are called strategic 
settings because, in order for a person to decide how to 
behave, he must consider how others around him choose 
their actions.” Joel Watson: Strategy: An Introduction to 
Game Theory, Norton & Co. 2013, p. 1. 
68  Erik Angner: A Course in Behavioural Economics, Pal-
grave Macmillan (2012), p. 176: “[Y]ou are playing a 
game whenever you face a decision problem in which the 
final outcome depends not just on your action, and on 
whatever state of the world obtains, but also on the ac-
tions of at least one other agent.” See also Avinash Dixit / 
or face to face by means of agents, as Islamic law 
includes a law of agency and makes provision for 
principal-agent relationships. The actions of po-
tentially contracting parties depend not only on 
their own interests but also on what they antici-
pate their counter-party will do.67 The relation-
ship and the thought processes animating the 
parties then are strategic. The same is true of 
many psychological experiments in behavioural 
economics, which together with economics and 
other social sciences has adopted formal model-
ling and game theory.68 Viewing negotiation, con-
tracting and trading as games necessitates articu-
lating assumptions about player motivation. It is 
probably true to say, on casual observation, that 
the primary Islamic texts broadly expect more 
honesty, altruism and benevolence of Homo Isla-
micus69 than standard economic theory does of 
Homo Economicus. Without developing a full-scale 
representation of human nature in Islam – which 
would be well outside the purview of this ar-
ticle – suffice it to say that Islam does not depart 
in any material fashion in its understanding of 
human motivations in arms-length commercial 
transactions. If after all humans were angels (to 
borrow a phrase from another time and place),  
  
Susan Skeath / David Reiley: Games of Strategy, Norton & 
Co. 2009, p. 3. Game theory began with the analyses of 
James Waldegrave of card games, in 1713; in the 1800s 
game theorists Antoine Augustin Cournot and Francis 
Ysidro Edgeworth used game theory to analyse condi-
tions of oligopoly; in 1913 Ernest Zermelo developed a 
formal theory in relation to chess. John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern produced the seminal Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior, Princeton 1944, which sought to 
represent games in a precisely mathematical form. Later 
John Nash made the crucial distinction between cooper-
ative and non-cooperative games. On the history and ac-
complishments of game theoretic analysis, see Watson 
(fn. 67), pp. 1 f. 
69  See ḥadīṯ (fn. 39 f.). 
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there would be no need to outlaw ribā. What fol-
lows in this section states three of the central in-
sights from behavioural economic theory in order 
to demonstrate that these insights help to ac-
count for the ribā rules. Stating the same propos-
ition in historical, chronological order, the claim 
that this section supports is that Islamic law re-
cognised and made allowances for insights later 
empirically tested by behavioural economists. 
The three insights as evidenced and elaborated 
by modern behavioural economics are: adverse 
selection 1, framing effects, which encompass 
both the endowment effect and loss aversion 2, 
and temporal discounting 3. 
1  Adverse Selection 
In a contractual negotiation where the parties 
lack equal knowledge or expertise regarding the 
subject matter or consideration, either the offeror 
or the offeree possesses an informational advan-
tage over the other party. A situation where the 
offeror possesses the informational advantage ty-
pifies adverse selection as theorised in the mo-
dern economics literature. However section 
D II 1 b below extrapolates from that application 
of the concept of adverse selection to consider cir-
cumstances where the advantage is the offeree’s. 
a)  Offeror’s Advantage 
Adverse selection occurs when one party has 
greater information about a good or service being 
offered. The informationally advantaged party 
will trade selectively, to maximise their advan-
tage, doing so to the detriment of their counter-
party. This is straightforwardly a zero-sum 
game – one party’s loss is the other party’s gain.  
                                                          
70  George A. Akerlof: The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 84.3 (1970), p. 488. Together with  
colleagues Akerlof received the Nobel Prize in 2001 for 
In the classic article on adverse selection70 the ex-
ample of ‘lemons’ (poor-quality or defective used 
cars) appears. Since used car buyers cannot 
readily (or at all) distinguish between high-qual-
ity and low-quality cars, buyers are always wil-
ling to pay less than they would were they confi-
dent in their ability to be more discerning. As a 
result owners of high-quality used cars are dis-
couraged from selling, as they will obtain a lower 
price than they would if information were equal-
ly available to both prospective parties. As a fur-
ther consequence the quality of used cars in the 
market predictably declines. The economic conse-
quence of this state of affairs is deadweight loss: 
lost efficiency and foregone trades that would 
have been mutually advantageous. As Akerlof 
states: 
There are many markets in which buyers use 
some market statistic to judge the quality of 
prospective purchases. In this case there is in-
centive for sellers to market poor quality mer-
chandise, since the returns for good quality ac-
crue mainly to the entire group whose statistic 
is affected rather than to the individual seller. 
As a result there tends to be a reduction in the 
average quality of goods and also in the size of 
the market.71 
Adverse selection is a problem which marking to 
market does not eliminate. However it reduces it, 
as compared to a situation where the parties bar-
ter without offering the good on an open market; 
the effect of the market is that a greater (al-
though depending upon the size of the market 
possibly still an imperfect and asymmetric) de-
gree of information about the quality and value 
of the product becomes available to prospective 
buyers. The situation envisaged in Islamic legal  
  
analysing markets characterised by asymmetric inform-
ation. 
71  Ibid. 
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texts in which the exchange of commodities of 
different grades is far worse than the problem of 
adverse selection identified by Akerlof as there is 
effectively no market and therefore no ‘market 
statistic’. Consequently the requirement of mark-
ing to market as prescribed by the ribā rules re-
presents incremental progress: it reduces adverse 
selection and the sub-optimal outcomes envi-
saged by the ‘lemon’ problem. This problem may 
but need not be framed in terms of the unilateral 
exploitation of the buyer since the seller and the 
larger economy may also suffer from adverse se-
lection. To be sure, additional remedies such as 
warranties or certifications by independent third 
parties (for instance in the case of used cars) is 
necessary in order to reduce reliance on inter-
personal trust, or to reduce deficits in trust and 
to remedy the problem of adverse selection with 
respect to any particular product and market.  
b)  Offeree’s Advantage  
Although not the situation envisaged by Akerlof, 
the informational advantage may be reversed: 
the offeree may possess skills or expertise that the 
offeror lacks. To give some simple examples: Sel-
ling family heirlooms, antiques, or pawning al-
most anything virtually guarantees that the pro-
spective offeree who is acting in the course of 
their business (where the offeror is not, and is a 
relative amateur) will have negotiating leverage 
created among other things by a knowledge of the 
relevant market(s), value, price and probable 
price movements. Just as in D II 1 a, marking to 
market does not fully protect the offeror. How-
ever it reduces the probability that the seller will 
receive less than the market value and sustain an 
unfair and avoidable loss. Taking the good to 
market means that there is no obligation to sell 
to any particular person, further protecting the 
                                                          
72  Narrated by Muslim, quoted in Gamal (fn. 63), p. 118. 
73  Pareto optimality is the situation where goods or 
other resources are distributed in such a way that any re-
seller. A well-known ḥadīṯ encapsulates the themes 
of information asymmetry and market functions: 
“Let not a city-dweller sell on behalf of an incom-
ing Bedouin. Leave the people so that Allāh may 
make them benefit one another.”72 Here the sel-
ler, the Bedouin freshly arrived from the desert is 
at an informational disadvantage, ripe for exploi-
tation. The ḥadīṯ proposes the market as a protec-
tive device, one that will maximise mutual ad-
vantage, or at least avoid the exploitation of one 
party’s ignorance. That is not to say that the ex-
istence of a market guarantees better results for 
the new arrival as he may meet deception and 
treachery in town; however having access to the 
market represents an incremental, relative im-
provement from the position of unequal leverage 
and information sure to obtain on the outskirts of 
the city. From a systemic perspective, marking to 
market as indicated by the ribā rules reduces in-
formational asymmetries, and the uncertainties 
and risks borne by one or both parties; it increa-
ses efficiency, frequency of trade, and the prob-
ability of achieving and maintaining Pareto opti-
mality.73 
2  Framing Effects: The Endowment 
Effect and Loss Aversion 
A framing effect is one where a person’s prefer-
ences depend on how the options are presented 
to him or her.74 It is a significant irrationality be-
cause there is no necessary correspondence be-
tween how options are presented or framed, and 
the benefit (or in economic terms, the utility) of 
the respective options. The perfectly rational eco-
nomic actor is immune to framing effects and 
would consistently disregard appearances created 
by means of presentation. However empirical 
evidence demonstrates a high incidence of fram-
ing effects, two of which will be explained here.  
distribution will cause at least one person to become 
worse off.  
74  Angner (fn. 68), p. 45. 
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Possession of a good by itself tends to cause the 
possessor to overvalue the good. This is known as 
the endowment effect. In colloquial terms we 
cherish what we have, simply because it is ours. 
A variety of psychological explanations can be 
given but for present purposes it is enough to 
note that this characteristic overvaluing of proper-
ty entails a tendency (when offering a possession 
for sale) to demand an inflated price.75 There 
need be no allegation of extortionate behaviour 
or unfairness here, since the endowment effect 
operates at the level of affective preference 
rather than strategic calculation. Translating 
goods or other property possessed into money’s 
worth is a form of reality-testing, effectively the 
debunking of the endowment effect when the of-
feror settles for an equilibrium price imposed by 
the market – how much (or how little) the mar-
ket will bear.  
Logically speaking an entailment of the endow-
ment effect is another effect: aversion to loss. The 
experimental finding is “the apparent fact that 
people dislike losses more than they like com-
mensurate gains. Loss aversion is reflected in the 
fact that many people are more upset when they 
lose something than pleased when they find the 
same thing.”76 People accord less importance to 
gains than to losses, which in economic terms is 
expressed as the proposition that they discount 
gains more than they discount losses. Such nega-
tive discounting of loss is one form of dynamic 
inconsistency.77 Arithmetically losses and gains 
of equal magnitude are the same (a pound incom-
ing is equal in value to a pound outgoing). There-
fore logically there should be no discount. Gener-
alised risk aversion is one of the side-effects of 
the negative discounting of loss.
                                                          
75  Ibid.: The “manner in which people assess various 
options might depend on a reference point – in this case, 
their current endowment”. 
76  Ibid. 
77  R. Thaler: Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic In-
consistency, in: Economic Letters 8 (1981), p. 201. 
Whether a good is bartered or sold for money, the 
endowment effect and loss aversion reduces the 
number of mutually advantageous exchanges 
that take place. Exposure to a market as opposed 
to exposure to a single buyer, however, is likely 
to diminish each of these two effects and there-
fore to increase the number of mutually benefi-
cial trades. In relation to the endowment effect if 
many parties (as in a large market) have rejected 
an offered price, as opposed to only a single 
buyer (or to a small number in a series of one-on-
one attempted barter transactions), the reduction 
in the endowment effect is likely to be corre-
spondingly greater.  
In relation to loss aversion, the larger the mar-
ket exposure and the greater the information that 
is factored into the price, the greater assurance 
the buyer has that selling represents an appre-
ciable gain rather than a loss. And the perceived 
likelihood that they are cheated or treated unfair-
ly correspondingly diminishes. By requiring mark-
ing to market the ribā rules require market expos-
ure, which is as or more important for redressing 
the irrational endowment effect and loss aversion 
as is the conversion of perceived value into a 
monetary price.  
3  Temporal Discounting 
A second form of dynamic inconsistency is when 
preferences are inconsistent over time. The ac-
tual value of two options does not change simply 
because time elapses.78 However the tendency to 
discount an option that is further in the future is 
a marked human tendency, even when the dis-
counting is so great as to make it irrational.79 The 
78  Angner (fn. 68), p. 159. However, a sufficiently distant 
time horizon arguably does justify discounting, for ex-
ample if extended out after a person’s anticipated date of 
death. 
79  “Thus, events deferred one year in the immediate fu-
ture is discounted much more heavily than ones deferred 
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experimental findings however suggest that peo-
ple tend to postpone loss for immediate gain,80 
which is irrational and a further manifestation of 
loss aversion. Future discounting is also, to put 
the point simply, a form of impatience and an in-
ability to delay gratification – even when it is 
known that such delay will be rewarded with an 
increased pay-off. Impulsivity, self-control prob-
lems, and weakness of will conspire to make the 
execution of plans difficult or impossible, de-
pending upon the continence and temperance of 
the individual in question.81 As a result of these 
tendencies people are liable to take on debt in 
order to enable immediate consumption; 82 post-
pone pain for pleasure; and to ‘mortgage’ their 
financial futures. The credit ribā rule addresses 
these behaviours of temporal discounting. If cre-
dit is not readily available it will be impossible 
to indulge these tendencies. People are forced to 
live within their means; they are also compelled 
to increase their rate of saving. Easy credit has 
the opposite motivational effect. It feeds rather 
than retards inconsistent time preferences and 
framing effects. 
E  Conclusion: Some Characteristics of 
Money in English and Islamic Law 
The purpose of this article is to juxtapose two 
normative frameworks and the law developing 
out of them, having regard to the operative eco-
nomic definition of money, and to the legal regu-
lation and control of the uses of money. The law 
adds nothing to the economic definition of  
                                                          
one year in the distant future. This is the common differ-
ence effect.” Gamal (fn. 63), p. 120. 
80  Angner (fn. 68), p. 159. 
81  Compare Harry Frankfurt on second order desires; 
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in: The 
Journal of Philosophy 68.1 (1971), p. 5. 
82  Thaler (fn. 77), ibid. 
money. This article restated that tripartite defini-
tion in the Introduction. This article then traced 
the world historical evolution from the barter 
system to the creation of commodity money, and 
finally to the manufacture of paper or electronic 
fiat money denominated in currency. Notwith-
standing the law’s reliance on economics for the 
definition of money, the law alone decides what 
may or may not be done with money. Broadly 
both English and Islamic law presuppose the va-
lue of trade and the existence of market capital-
ism. Each permits according time value to money 
and the commoditization of money. This article 
set itself the aim of explaining why then Islamic 
law alone (among the world’s legal systems, na-
tional and non-national) condemns usury.  
The common law adopts what could be cha-
racterised as a laissez-faire approach to interest 
and debt. It is clear that neither the standard eco-
nomic nor the behavioural economic model have 
impinged upon or altered this approach. Charac-
teristically and probably wisely the courts have 
largely left money and business to the professional 
people of banking and business – to managers, 
boards, and entrepreneurs.83 
With regard to Islamic commercial law, this ar-
ticle has surveyed the primary and secondary 
sources, selecting two theories from Islamic 
legal-intellectual traditions for further scrutiny. 
Based on psychological traits hypothesized by be-
havioural economists regarding human attitudes 
towards property, and the effects of markets and 
monetisation, this article claims that an overrid-
ing imperative drives the ribā rules: reducing the 
  
83  On the reticence of the English courts to intervene in 
management: Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
[1974] AC 821 (PC) [835]. There is however greater scope 
for intervention by statute, with the Companies Act 2006 
and within it director’s duties (chapter 2 concerning the 
general duties) being substantial examples. 
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losses and risks individuals incur by acting on in-
complete information and predictably biased be-
liefs. The article contends that this fuller cognis-
ance of some characteristics of money and de-
monstrable human proclivities have given rise to 
and to some extent continue to justify prohibi-
tions that English law does not impose. 
It is not the purpose of this article to defend 
or to advocate English, Islamic or any other at-
tempt to regulate money or monetary transac-
tions by means of law. However having at least 
tacitly intimated that the ribā rules are based on 
a more complete analysis of human nature and 
the mischiefs to which money may act as an ac-
cessory, it is worth concluding by briefly enter-
taining some possible rejoinders to the claims 
made, namely that the ribā rules are: (a) paterna-
listic, (b) moralising, and (c) impracticable. 
Regarding (a), there is no doubt that the abo-
lition of credit would be both paternalistic and 
draconian. However this is not the position at Is-
lamic law, which has devised means of financing 
that supply credit and liquidity, even as they re-
strain lending as such by requiring the presence 
of an asset (as contrasted with a pure debt obliga-
tion) or joint exposure to loss and risk in pursuit 
of profits (as in partnerships). Islamic finance re-
strains leverage and limits the quantum of liabil-
ities with the requirement of an asset, as is also 
the case with asset-based finance pledging no 
fealty to Islamic law. In addition this article has 
demonstrated that Islamic law permits according 
a time value to money, contrary to what an un-
qualified equation of ribā and interest would sug-
gest.
                                                          
84  It might be thought that freedom of contract is prim-
ary in English law, whereas it is secondary in Islamic law 
where some notion of justice is primary. However this 
generalisation is hardly tenable considering statutory in-
terventions in English, European Union and international 
law, with which Islamic law has not kept up due to its 
status as non-national law: for example, Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, a host of 
Regarding (b), it is certainly true that the ribā 
rules interdict transactions, reducing the freedom 
to contract, as well as the ease with which re-
sources can be mobilised – even for the best mo-
tives and most worthy objectives. As the organic 
development of English contract law readily de-
monstrates party autonomy is not an absolute va-
lue, but one that is tempered by policy and a con-
tinuing accretion of terms implied by statute. 
Freedom of contract is nowhere of infinite weight 
in the scales of justice.84 Different states and so-
cieties can and should strike the balance in differ-
ent ways.85 Calling one attempt at completing 
this balancing exercise moralising and another li-
berating would be quite arbitrary and senseless.  
(C) amplifies both (a) and (b). The impracti-
cability of the ribā rules is the most serious objec-
tion that can be made regarding the application 
of Islamic commercial law in modern times, and 
a challenge that the nascent Islamic banking in-
dustry seeks to meet, with varying levels of suc-
cess.86 Even if Islamic law does not abolish the 
provision of finance facilities, it still proposes a 
drastic curtailment of the status quo. It is the pro-
verbial sledge hammer cracking a walnut. The 
world is through and through inter-penetrated by 
debt and debt-like obligations; loans are the very 
lifeblood of governments, companies and house-
holds. Efforts to ‘Islamize’ entire economies have 
failed miserably, for a host of reasons. At the 
same time a diatribe against debt (which this ar-
ticle is not) would likely meet with a receptive 
audience in many quarters, not least because of 
the latest global economic crisis fomented by the  
  
European directives, UNIDROIT, and other efforts to har-
monise contract law. 
85  Compare Charles de Secondat Baron de Montes-
quieu: The Spirit of Laws, transl. by Thomas Nugent, Bell 
& Sons 1914. 
86  On the significance of Islamic finance and its impact 
on šarīʿa: Jonathan Ercanbrack: The Transformation of Is-
lamic Law in Global Financial Markets, CUP 2015. 
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following factors, among others: indiscriminate 
lending, excessive consumer borrowing, insuffi-
cient national saving, the fettered judgment or 
negligence of rating agencies, excessive lever-
aging of banks, and the trading of derivatives de-
tached from real assets. In short, a recognisable 
pattern of human failings writ large. 
As a concluding assessment this article sug-
gests that Islamic law to a greater degree than 
English law appears to incorporate several sound 
insights regarding bounded and imperfect ration-
ality; judgment that is clouded by framing ef-
fects; inconsistent dynamic preferences across 
loss and gain, and unwarranted future discount-
ing. A diagnosis is not a cure. However a diagno-
sis further elaborated under modern-day condi-
tions by means of rigorous social scientific meth-
ods may clarify likely effects of adopting in mo-
dified, partial form the ribā rules. In the alterna-
tive, those rules serve as a reminder of the role of 
markets as mechanisms for equalising informa-
tion, and monetisation as a means of increasing 
efficiency, fairness and mutually beneficial ex-
changes. The Islamic understanding of debt and 
interest, and the verification of that understand-
ing by empirical research occasions – in an indi-
cative list – a revaluation of possible: Parliamen-
tary interventions promulgating some sensible 
form of usury statute; regulatory controls on 
credit card interest rates; banking disclosure 
rules; public financial and accounting education; 
mandatory borrowing and due diligence require-
ments for lenders; and adequate prudential re-
quirements for financial institutions. The story of 
Islamic economics, banking and finance is a story 
whose ending is not yet known. However that 
story might unfold, perhaps the ribā rules are best 
understood as a provocative antithesis to the rou-
tine, contemporary provision of banking services 
and financing. An antithesis preceding a synthe-
sis that may yet arrive and may come to rest at 
some as yet unimagined equilibrium.  
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